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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate and provide pathways for leveraging the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD’s) Ten Global Principles (TGPs) for countering tax crimes in the EU. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study is guided by the combination of traditional and innovative 
research methods drawn from criminal law and justice, public regulatory theory and tax law, based on socio-
legal and comparative methodologies. 
Findings – The research shows that EU has achieved considerable amount of progress when it comes to 
meeting the TGPs. However, law and practice in EU Member States indicate that there are different legal, 
human and organisational approaches to fighting tax crimes. The TGPs could be strategically applied to 
complementing the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) and other initiatives on 
Administrative Cooperation. 
Research limitations/implications – Although the TGPs appear encompassing, there are 
opportunities to harness the potency of these principles and to provide more tailored principles that can help 
engineer sustainable remedies for countering tax crimes in the EU. 
Practical implications – The paper critically analyses, through a multidisciplinary approach, the main 
legal, human and organisational factors influencing the prosecution of tax crimes in the EU Member States. 
Social implications – Realignment and harmonisation of tax enforcement paractices in the EU Member 
States thus help in the reduction of tax gap resulting from tax offences. 
Originality/value – The paper provides novel approaches and findings based on empirical info obtained 
from face-to-face focus groups with end users and law enforcement agencies in tax enforcement eco-system in 
ten different EU Member States. 
Keywords European Union, Tax crimes, Countering tax crimes, Ten Global Principles (TGPs) 
Paper type Research paper 
1. Understanding the contours of tax crime in the European Union and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Tax evasion, false accounting and reporting (tax fraud) are some of the broad terms of tax 
offences in EU Member States (MS). Tax fraud is found in direct taxes such as income or profit 
taxes and in indirect taxes such as the value-added tax (VAT) (OECD, 2018a; Bonch-
Osmolovskiy et al., 2018). While the presence and volume of tax crimes are acknowledged, and 
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JFC estimated to be between 50 and 70bn euros per year in the EU (EU Commission, 2019a, p. 8),  tax  
crimes such as tax evasion and fraud are understood and treated differently by MS (Panayi, 
2015; PROTAX, 2018; Turksen, 2018). 
Despite its prevalence, neither the EU nor the OECD have clearly defined tax crime/s. 
OECD has attempted to define tax crime aa: 
[. . .] a form of deliberate evasion of tax which is generally punishable under criminal law [. . .] 
[and that it] includes situations in which deliberately false statements are submitted, fake 
documents are produced, etc” (IBFD, 2009; Suso, 2014). 
The EU, on the other hand, has not provided a unified definition of tax crimes in its acquis 
communautaire (Thirion and Scherrer, 2017)1 as it has been difficult to achieve consensus 
among its MS (Suso, 2014)2. Nevertheless, tax crime/s can be generally defined as any 
conduct by taxpayers that involves evasion, or fraud on tax payments that are due the State 
and for which the law recognises as a criminal conduct. The most common behaviours 
across the chain of tax offenses in almost all the EU MS are that of fraud and dishonesty 
(Suso, 2014). 
Taxpayers use complex methods to commit tax crimes. By conducting 13 case studies 
pertaining to 10 EU MS, PROTAX (2018) has found that transnational companies use 
complex methods to commit tax crimes, including shell companies (missing trader), trusts, 
VAT carousel, profit-shifting, and free-ports (PROTAX, 2018). 
Regardless of how tax crime is defined and operationalised, both the OECD and EU 
regard tax crimes as a grave concern and, therefore, is one of their topmost priorities, as they 
pose a threat to their economic and strategic interests (OECD, 2018a; Cobham, 2005). 
Tax crimes are predicated upon the following factors: Inadequate legal frameworks, lax 
regulation, secrecy and weak inter-agency cooperation (OECD, 2018a). To find durable 
solutions for the dangers of tax crimes, the above non-exhaustive factors have to be 
addressed in tandem with issues such as the legitimacy and integrity of authorities (Tyler, 
2006) such as tax administrations. 
The OECD’s Ten Global Principles (TGPs) for fighting tax crimes, under the fifth 
OECD’s Forum on Tax and Crime, is a good example of an international initiative to counter 
such illegal activity. The EU is also active in this sphere by various actions, including, its 
task force at the EU Parliament, TAX3 (EU Parliament, 2019a), which focuses on tax crimes 
and H2020 programme financing research consortiums such as PROTAX and COFFERS to 
provide the much-needed toolkits to counter tax crimes in the EU. 
It is imperative that tax crime solutions are designed with durability in mind (Gimdal, 
2016) as the methods tax criminals use evolve and exploit gaps continuously. Temporary 
fixes of tax crimes would have unintended consequences such as empowering tax evaders to 
develop more sophisticated strategies from the past experiences to evade taxes. It is not yet 
clear if and to what extent the OECD’s TGPs provide durable solutions for fighting tax 
crimes in the EU. However, they can be the right direction to go in terms of harmonising 
policy and tax enforcement practices. 
This paper examines the extent to which the current EU measures against tax crimes have 
been aligned to the TGPs. The non-criminal aspects of countering tax such as tax avoidance 
and aggressive tax planning are beyond the scope of this paper, thus have not been addressed. 
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Ten Global 
Principles and the European Union’s tax crime measures 
The analysis of the TGPs indicates that they aim to foster and/or improve ten interlinked 
aims that have been examined in turn below: 
2.1 Criminalisation of tax offences 
The first of the TGPs urges States to establish a legal framework that will “ensure that 
violations of tax law are included as a criminal offence and that effective sanctions should be 
applied in practice” (OECD, 2017). The criminalisation of tax offences is a potent tool not 
only for empowering investigators and prosecutors but also for preventing tax crimes and 
raising the bar of no-nonsense-approach to tax offences (OECD, 2017). 
Criminalising the violation of tax law could differ depending on the legal system of the 
jurisdiction (Thirion and Scherrer, 2017). However, regardless of the nature of the “particular 
culture, policy and legislative environment” which mirrors the nature of legal framework, 
this principle demonstrates that any legal framework “will be most effective” if, in effect, it 
endeavours to not only clearly define tax crimes but also make criminal sanctions 
harmonised and proportionate to the severity of the tax crimes so that criminals cannot 
exploit such differences. 
PROTAX has found that in a number of countries the efforts to counter tax crimes are 
suffering from a lack of clear jurisdiction between criminal and administrative law and 
fiscal policy. So, there is “the need for clear jurisdiction over tax crimes” which includes the 
need to have clarity about simultaneously conducting both criminal and administrative 
trials. The lack of this clarity allowed the “criminal court judge [in Wildenstein3 case] [. . .] to  
favour an immediate court decision as opposed to waiting for the decision of the 
administrative court judge” (PROTAX, 2018). PROTAX also found that although the 
sampled EU States have operational legal frameworks for countering tax crimes, many of 
those legal frameworks are not highly effective in the criminalisation of tax offenses. 
PROTAX (2018) study revealed that: 
 The criminal burden of proof is often difficult to satisfy. This makes civil or 
administrative action a more attractive option for tax officials. Apart from the 
challenges in proving actus reus or “criminal act” against tax laws, prosecutors 
often find it difficult to demonstrate mens rea, or intention of tax offenders to evade 
taxes and, therefore, the difficulty in establishing strict criminal liability in many 
EU jurisdictions where these two legal tests do apply. 
 The threshold regimes for criminal sanctions in many of the case studies are 
deemed to be low and needs to be reviewed. 
 Thus, related to the low sanctions’ thresholds is to the effect that “some jurisdictions 
in EU impose heavy criminal sanctions for tax crimes with little consideration given 
to so-called ‘sweetheart deals’”. Poland is one of such countries (PROTAX, 2018). 
These findings buttress the finding of the European Parliamentary Research Service (2017), 
which revealed that respondent EU countries “had a functioning legal framework to fight 
tax evasion” albeit with a mixture “of administrative and criminal offences and sanctions” 
(Thirion and Scherrer, 2017) in which the criminalising domain was widely conflictual and 
not stringent. Subsequently, the efforts towards improvements in the administrative legal 
regime to counter tax crimes in the EU, although commendable, have had limited success 
(Remeur, 2016). 
While the Fifth AMLD (EU) 2018/843 has included tax crimes as a predicate offence, it 
has not provided any further information as to what amounts to a tax crime (EU, 2018/843). 
Sufficing to note that the proceeding AMLD (EU) 2018/1673), “Combating Money 
Laundering by Criminal Law” (CMLCL), appears to have enhanced level of stringent 
measures reasonable enough to deter tax crimes and for which all MS must adopt (pursuant 
to Article 8). The provisions therein essentially provide that in dealing with liability of legal 
OECD’s global 
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criminal and non-criminal fines. Additionally, it gives jurisdiction to judges to impose any 
additional punitive measures they deem fit; excluding tax offenders from having entitlement 
and access to public services support and funding; permanently banning tax offenders from 
engaging in commercial business; winding up the company and to completely shut down 
the businesses that have been used by the taxpayer to commit the tax offence (EU, 2018/ 
1673). 
Article 5 of the CMLCL equally provides for effective, dissuasive and proportionate 
criminal penalties on offences under Articles 3 and 4. Penalties range from “a maximum 
term of imprisonment of at least four years” to “where necessary [be subjected] to additional 
sanctions or measures”. The CMLCL, therefore, gives impetus to enhancing the fight against 
tax crimes in the EU as it complements the Fifth AMLD to further highlight criminal 
offences and the sanctions thereof. These are obvious improvements in the sanctioning 
regime (EU, 2018/1673). 
Criminalisation of tax offenses is still a far cry when it comes to EU anti-tax evasion and 
fraud laws. This averment is informed by the lack of harmony in definitions of tax crimes 
across the EU MS. The CMLCL does not address the lack of harmony in the definition of tax 
crimes (EU, 2018/1673). 
2.2 Effectiveness of strategising against tax crimes 
Laws on countering tax crimes must be effective. To achieve this, States should put in place 
a strategy for fighting tax crimes, which should be subject to regular review and monitoring 
(OECD, 2017b). There are varying strategies for the differing legal mechanisms to secure 
compliance of tax laws in many EU countries. Largely, EU and its MS, thus, have strategies 
and plans to fight tax crimes. For instance, in Spain, the Tax Agency comes out with a tax 
compliance plan that details “tax compliance and enforcement measures”, almost every year 
(PROTAX, 2019). These strategies “range from deterrence-based enforcement strategies to 
persuasive and cooperative models”. However, the defining characteristics between criminal 
tax offences and administrative tax offences are seen to be blurry in many EU MS and there 
is lack of clarity as to “whether these two types of sanctions are complementary or 
conflicting” (Thirion and Scherrer, 2017). 
This confusion derives inspiration from the blurry and complicated nature of the 
strategies put in place to approach the distinction between criminal tax offences and 
administrative tax offences at the EU level (ECOFIN, 1997). It must be noted that the 
transitioning of EU legal order from traditional civil procedure/enforcement of tax law to 
criminal enforcement/criminal justice system and sanctioning of tax crimes appears 
chequered. This shift must be completely overhauled, in terms of legal provisions, 
LEA capabilities and capacities. For a start, EU criminal laws relating to tax crimes must 
be consolidated. Consolidation of EU law on tax crimes will bring greater clarity for both 
LEAs and the public. Although some strategies are functioning in respective national 
contexts, effectiveness of strategies to fight tax crimes do not show solid results 
particularly when cross-border tax evasion activities are concerned. In the EU’s Single 
Market where goods, capital and people can move freely, it is imperative to create a 
harmonised tax enforcement strategy which must be underpinned by compatible legal 
provisions across all EU MS. This is notwithstanding the tax competition and 
sovereignty issues that may be used by some MS to resist the attempt to harmonise. 
Efforts must, however, be made to get it done because that would be a durable solution. 
2.3 Adequacy of investigative powers 
The third principle stipulates that States must establish “appropriate investigative powers 
sufficient to capacitate investigators in a way that result in successful investigation of tax 
crimes” (OECD, 2017 b). Article 11 of the CMLCL recognises this principle and mandates EU 
MS to take “necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools” are availed to 
competent authorities as established by Articles 3(1) and (5) and 4 thereof (EU, 2018/1673). 
The powers and obligations granted by this EU legal instrument may be considered as 
effective, as they move in the direction of the TGP. However, effective transposition and 
enforcement of these provisions across all the EU MS may still be challenged due to 
peculiarities in the national legal regimes of the EU. For instance, PROTAX (2018) found 
that although EU countries such as Germany, Luxemburg, Spain, Austria, UK and France 
have given significant powers to investigative authorities, the challenge of deficit in 
collaborative investigation of agencies loomed large in a number of these countries. The 
Case Study of France typically demonstrated that the court was faced with the weaknesses 
in the investigations mainly due to “limited capacity to collect evidence on some offshore 
trusts”. However, there may be times when investigators can be tempted to abuse their 
powers when the needed investigative powers are granted them. Therefore, while EU strives 
to ensure that adequate investigative powers are granted tax authorities, there has to be 
checks and balances in which the efforts to establish culpability or otherwise goes with 
strict accountability and liability measures. 
2.4 Effectiveness of powers to freeze, seize and confiscate assets 
The fourth TGP requires States to put in place measures that give appropriate authorities ‘the 
ability to freeze/seize assets in the course of any investigation of tax crimes, and the ability to 
get assets of tax offenders confiscated’ (OECD, 2017). Article 9 of CMLCL (EU, 2018/1673) 
indeed obliges MS to ensure “that their competent authorities freeze or confiscate [assets], in 
accordance with Directive 2014/42/EU”. Furthermore, the EU Directive 2014/42/EU has 
established the “minimum rules on the freezing and confiscation of the instrumentalities and 
proceeds of crime in criminal matters”. However, only 11 of the 28 EU countries have been 
identified by OECD to equip their tax authorities with the powers to freeze, seize and confiscate 
assets of tax criminals (OECD, 2017). Findings of PROTAX (2018) support the limited number 
of EU MS that have granted requisite powers to tax authorities to freeze, seize and confiscate 
assets with criminal links. However, Estonia stands out as a country with remarkable powers 
for tax authorities to confiscate assets of tax criminals. 
The CMLCL requires EU MS to transpose the provisions into national law by 3 
December 2020 with the expectation that the loopholes from the Directive 2014/42/EU and 
the Fifth AMLD (Directive (EU) 2018/843) will be addressed, at the minimum. In fact, per 
Article 9 of the CMLCL, part of the loopholes that have been closed off is the clear featuring 
of the mandate of EU MS to empower their competent tax authorities to confiscate criminal 
proceeds that include those from tax crimes (EU, 2018/1673). 
2.5 Organisational structure with defined responsibilities 
The fifth TGP is aligned to the disposition that States are required to “adopt an 
organisational model that clearly defines responsibilities for fighting tax crime and other 
financial crimes” (OECD, 2017). This principle is still a major challenge in many EU 
countries, although the EU has urged its MS to ensure that this requirement is achieved 
(PROTAX, 2018). The key rationale behind this approach is that evaded taxable assets do 
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In respect of the sixth TGP, states are required to ensure that institutions responsible for 
investigating tax crimes are given adequate resources to conduct their duties (OECD, 2017). 
These include financial, human and infrastructural resources. This principle has been 
recognised by the EU, but many EU countries still struggle with the adequacy of resources 
availed to their LEAs. PROTAX (2018) found that countries such as Spain, the UK, Portugal 
and Ireland had challenges with providing the necessary resources to tax crime 
investigators and tax authorities (Cross, 2017; Buchan, 2018). Tax authorities also lack 
access to specific types of expertise or tools for forensic analysis needed for complex and 
cross-border fraudulent schemes (PROTAX, 2018). The lack of resources becomes crucial 
when under-staffed prosecution faces several lawyers from top-end law firms in court. 
However, care must be taken not to pay undue attention to the resource provision at the 
expense of the other equally important areas such as ensuring efficiency. 
2.7 Tax crimes as a predicate offence for money laundering 
The seventh principle urges States to “designate tax crimes as one of the predicate offences 
for money laundering” (OECD, 2017). Tax crime is a predicate offence for money laundering 
in the EU under the Fifth EU AML Directive (EU) 2018/843. Tax crimes have now been well-
established as predicate offences for money laundering by international institutions such as 
the EU, OECD, and FATF along with most of their compliant MS (OECD, 2017). However, 
while the EU is eager to progress to its Fifth AML regime, the standards required by the 
Fourth AMLD 2015/849 has not been implemented fully in at least 10 EU countries. On 24 
January 2019, pursuant to enforcement action under Article 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, the EU Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Germany; 
reasoned opinions to Belgium, Finland, France, Lithuania, Portugal; and additional reasoned 
opinions to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland and Slovakia for failing to completely transpose the 
Fourth AMLD into national law (EU Commission, 2019b)4. So, although tax crime is 
recognised by the EU as a predicate offence (EU, 2015/849), there are a number of MS that 
still have not transposed this provision (PROTAX, 2018). This does not augur well for the 
EU-wide fight against tax crimes. It does not appear that this principle would run into crisis 
in its pursuit. However, it is possible for a proposal to be made to rephrase this principle 
that, States should consolidate all Illicit Financial Flows as predicate offences for tax crimes 
as all these sources of funds have high potential risks of being used to commit tax crimes. 
2.8 Effectiveness of framework for domestic inter-agency cooperation 
With the eighth TGP, States are advised to establish “an effective legal and administrative 
framework for the facilitation of the collaboration between tax authorities and other 
domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies” (OECD, 2017). The EU uses the Fiscalis 
2020 programme to give assistance to its members in administering domestic tax systems 
(EU Commission, 2018d). This support consists of activities such as provision of necessary 
fora in “the exchange of best practices and cooperation between EU countries in several 
areas, including financial income, employment income, capital income, VAT and excises” 
(EU, 2015). Interagency cooperation is also used by the framework provided by the EU’s 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) (EU, 2011, 2011/16). 
Directive 2011/16/EU (DAC 1) in Direct Taxation) is the key legal instrument that 
supports MS to ensure that information on direct taxation are exchanged harmoniously 
amongst the EU MS (EU, 2015; EU Commission, 2020b, no date 2; EU, 2015). DAC has since 
had five amendments to strengthen cooperation amongst administrative agencies in the EU. 
It must be noted that three forms of information exchange can be appropriated in the DAC. 
These are “the exchange of information on request (EOIR); the spontaneous exchange of 
information (SEOI); and the automatic exchange of information (AEOI)” (EU Commission, 
2018a, 2018b, 2018/844). 
DAC 5 especially pierces the veil of company’s owners. According to Article 1 of DAC 5, 
EU MS are mandated to enact legislations that enable competent tax authorities to have 
access “to the mechanisms, procedures, documents and information referred to in Articles 
13, 30, 31 and 40 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council” 
relating to beneficial ownerships (EU Commission, 2020b, no date 2). Complementarily, the 
Fourth AMLD (Directive (EU) 2015/849) ushered in a regime of Ultimate Beneficial Owner 
(UBO) that unveils an additional layer to the information exchange framework in the 
criminalisation domain. UBO regime provides a register that takes custody of information 
about beneficial owners that are resident in the EU. According to Article 30 of the Fifth 
AMLD (EU) 2018/843, it is mandatory for EU institutions such as competent authorities, tax 
authorities, investigative agencies and FIUs to consult the UBO register in the course of 
conducting due diligence on money laundering issues. This is an important step because the 
reservoir of beneficial owners can avail relevant information to LEAs and asset recovery 
agencies. These measures characterise the OECD’s requirements for administrative 
cooperation (EU Commission, 2015) and fairly feature the exchange requirements in the 
TGPs’ 8. However, although progress has been made in this direction, more must be done in 
the area of seamless interagency cooperation since these measures have not been effectively 
used to counter tax crimes in the EU (Remeur, 2016). PROTAX (2018) revealed that 
interagency cooperation seems to rely on personal connections between LEA personnel 
rather than formal, legal agreements between the LEAs. Consistent with findings of 
previous studies, PROTAX (2018) also found inter-agency cooperation as a challenge in the 
EU; a particularity of challenge seems to be associated with the difficulty of “coordination 
and sharing of competence between administrative/financial and criminal procedures” 
amongst MS. This not only undermines effective investigation and prosecution but also 
forms a network of forces that results in resource wastage as obtained in the case of 
Wildenstein (PROTAX, 2018). 
2.9 Availability of international cooperation mechanisms 
The ninth principle states that “tax crime investigation agencies must have access to 
criminal legal instruments and an adequate operational framework for effective 
international co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of tax crimes” (OECD, 2017). 
The cross-border dimensions of tax crimes underlie the fundamental basis for the 
difficulty in finding effective remedies to tax crimes in the EU. The EU Commission has 
reported that EU’s VAT Gap in 2016 amounted to e147.1bn – thus, an equivalent of 12.3% 
total revenue loss across EU (EU Commission, 2018e). However, tax criminals with 
international networks do not only use the international platform to generate income hidden 
in one foreign jurisdiction or the other from tax administrations. They also transfer, layer 
and integrate the proceeds from tax crimes in foreign jurisdictions beyond the EU without 
the knowledge of tax authorities (OECD, 2017). International cooperation is essential for 
seizure, confiscation and recovery of criminal assets beyond the conviction of such crimes. 
Usually, investigative and prosecutorial powers of LEAs of states are limited to their 
jurisdictional boundaries. This necessitates the requirement for competent State agencies to 
internationally collaborate in political, legal, operational and judicial spheres with each other 
to share information and evidence, as well as culprits (if need be), “facilitation of witness 
testimony taking, transfer of suspected persons for further questioning or interrogation, 
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and recovery operations. 
Legal instruments required by this TGP to foster appropriate collaboration include 
“agreements on information sharing such as Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(OECD, 2018b; Tax Justice Network, 2009); Exchange of Information and Administrative 
Assistance Agreements; as well as Bilateral Tax Treaties and other instruments such as the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (OECD, 
2018c; Nelson, 1990). There are also supposed to be agreements for cooperation in the use of 
investigative and coercive powers, such as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties” (ICC, 
2012). 
These agreements must assume a holistic approach in countering the tax crimes. 
International efforts have been garnered to operationalise some aspects of these provisions. 
For instance, the World Bank has joined forces with OECD to encourage states to adopt the 
“‘whole-of-government approach’ to tackling financial crimes [including tax crimes] by 
fostering inter-agency and international co-operation” (The World Bank, 2018). The EU 
could develop original positions that reflect the realities and needs of the EU with respect to 
fighting tax crimes across the Union (OECD, 2017; OECD and The World Bank, 2018; EU 
Commission, 2015). 
The plethora of legal instruments in the EU make provision for the appropriate 
arrangements to be made on how MS should cooperate and exchange information on 
countering tax crimes in the EU. The 2012 European Commission’s Action Plan to strengthen 
the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, with more than 30 planned actions for fostering 
cooperation and information exchange, has been one of the key EU instruments for fighting 
tax crimes (EU Commission, 2012/722; EU, 2015). With respect to cooperation for information 
exchange, the DAC is particularly instructive. 
The analysis in TGP 8 above demonstrates that, even with its inadequacies, there are 
many ways in which this exchange of information regime can help fight tax crimes in the 
EU. Principally, transparency and cooperation become a hallmark and suspicious activities 
of tax crimes in EU MS are readily detected and shared with other MS (EU Commission, 
2018a, 2018b, 2018/844). In fact, Kaye (2014) observes that AEOI is deemed to present the 
most effective remedy to countering tax evasion. However, to date, not only establishing a 
beneficial ownership database has been a real challenge but also having access to audited 
accounts of companies (which should be open to the public for inspection and contain 
granular details of business transactions)5 (Owens and McDonell, 2018). 
Even with the above instruments for transnational cooperation against tax crimes, 
stronger cooperation at global level may still be difficult to reach (Bonch-Osmolovskiy et al., 
2018) in general and in the EU, in particular. At the moment, international cooperation on 
matters of tax crimes is just as challenged as the domestic inter-agency cooperation in TGP 
8 above (PROTAX, 2018). It is worth noting that the work of Joint Money Laundering 
Intelligence Task Force (JMLIT) in the UK has proven to create a sound public-private 
partnership and meaningful information sharing among key stakeholders (National Crime 
Agency (NCA), 2019). This model would be worth considering within and beyond the EU. 
2.10 Protection of the rights of suspects of tax crime 
The tenth TGP provides that taxpayers that have been “suspected or accused of committing 
a tax crime must be able to rely on basic procedural and fundamental rights” (OECD, 2017). 
EU MS have substantive laws that are generally in line with international and regional 
human rights instruments (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2000 and European 
Convention of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966) 
that require investigators and LEAs to respect. These legal instruments confer more 
protection than the rights established in the tenth TGP (Oberson, 2015; Mitsilegas and 
Vavoula, 2016; Endresen, 2017; Oberson, 2015). At the same time, what the TGPs and the 
EU AML legal framework neglect, is the protection and rights of whistle-blowers who have 
been instrumental in shedding light and aiding prosecution of financial crimes. The Panama 
Papers, SwissLeaks and LuxLeaks are some of the prominent examples. Despite the huge 
public service these disclosures offered, individual whistle-blowers faced criminalisation 
and/or retribution, reprisals, intimidation in the best scenario (Turksen, 2018). PROTAX 
(2018) revealed that, over 80% of EU MS earned a “zero” score in whistle-blower protection 
law (PROTAX, 2018; The Greens and European Free Alliance (EFA), 2017). This is a huge 
deficit in the EU which has a direct consequence for countering tax crimes. 
3. In search of durable solutions 
Just like any measure of criminal law, countering tax crimes has had two basic functions: to 
deter and punish criminality. The overall disposition of the TGPs and other measures adopted 
by the OECD and EU tend to be inclined to achieve deterrence, punishment and criminal 
justice. The following constitutes a brief analysis of the key measures on which the foregoing 
TGPs can be built upon to achieve durable solutions in countering tax crimes in the EU. 
One of the effective measures against tax crimes is to use high-end research and 
partnership to explore for sustainable ways to eviscerate both the old and new strategies 
which tax criminals use to flout applicable laws, as well as where they hide the profit they 
generate. To succeed in doing this, it is important to intensify the building of collaboration 
and “partnership between countries, partnership across different parts of government, and 
partnerships between policy-makers and operational leaders” (OECD, 2018d; Gimdal, 2016; 
Knobel, 2018; MacLennan, 2016). It goes without saying that professionals in the financial 
services sector and prudential supervisors, as gate keepers and enablers, must also be 
incorporated into the anti-tax crime strategies. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that anti-bribery and anti-money laundering obstacles are 
frontally addressed. To effectively harness the capacity of the systems of AML that can 
provide durable solutions for tax crimes, AML must be tackled with a multipronged 
approach that considers all layers of money laundering with a sense of responsibility and 
discipline (Turksen, 2015; Unger, 2014; Collovà, 2016; Savona and Riccardi, 2017). 
Rather than generic provisions of the AMLDs, it would be more targeted if criminal law 
on EU taxation were to be enacted which specifically focused on the varied connotations of 
tax crimes with elaborate investigative and prosecution powers and procedures, deterrent 
and punitive measures, as well as how the overall criminal justice in EU’s tax eco-system 
would be sustainably procured. The EU’s Sixth AMLD (EU, 2018/1673), for instance, could 
not only contain detailed provisions on tax crimes as predicate offences but also put forward 
substantive mechanisms to counter them. An associated legal instrument to the Sixth 
AMLD, is the Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 which also has scanty disposition for tax crimes 
(EU, 2018/1672). These gaps do raise concerns as to the seriousness that have been placed on 
tackling tax crimes by MS. 
Commitment to delivering transparency, through greater collaboration, broad-based 
automatic exchange of information and integration of tax systems, can help a great deal in 
delivering the other principles of durable solutions. Even though there are some misgivings 
about its practice (Woodward, 2016), transparency is highly needed to drastically improve, if 
not overhaul, the regulatory and legal framework of the current global financial system 
(GFS). This is because the GFS has been “characterised by laggard or outdated regulation 
and particularly by inadequate transparency” which has: 
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JFC [. . .] made it fairly easy for wrongdoers (including multinationals engaging in unfair tax 
agreements) to benefit from [. . .] [tax crimes], by hiding and mixing themselves, their assets and 
their transactions within legitimate uses of the global financial and tax system (Knobel, 2018). 
Of course, the limited transparency is occasioned by the conduct of the States (Woodward, 
2016), whose call to duty to address this is a pretty credible proposition to make. 
Another issue worth considering is the need for persistent technological innovation. 
Continuous improvement in legislation relating to the relationship between technology and 
tax payment systems is equally crucial because the fast-growing digital economy must be 
confronted in similar measure by appropriate tax legislations (UN-IATF, 2017; OECD, 2017). 
PROTAX found Estonia’s digitalisation process to be exemplary as the country “is 
pioneering electronic solutions to tax fraud with some considerable success” (PROTAX, 
2018). Durable solutions should also include broadening the tax base and integrate the 
informal sector (where the black economy thrives) into the formal economy in ways that 
clear off, at least, most of the hidden places used for tax-related criminal activities (UN-
IATF, 2017, p. 32). 
It is also important that whistle-blower protection laws are not only protective of and 
compensatory for whistle-blowers but must also be empowering for LEAs and highly 
punitive against tax criminals (PROTAX, 2018; Willsher, 2015; Turksen, 2018). The current 
EU whistle-blowing resolution (EU Parliament, 2016/2224) lacks the aforementioned 
features of durable solutions in this regard (EU Commission, 2018a, 2018b, 2018/218). The 20 
November 2018 vote by the Legal Affairs Committee to adopt an “EU-wide protection and 
support for whistle-blowers” is a step in the right direction because, importantly, the 
updated rules contained in the Commission’s proposed directive grant protection for 
“facilitators” (EU Commission, 2018c). 
Providing durable solutions for tax crimes must encapsulate operative instruments that 
are resilient with a broad-based framework that is anchored on the ability of the framework 
to be insulated against or withstand the pressures from tax evaders. This should factor in – 
as much as possible – all interests of stakeholders in a mutually aligned framework, no 
matter the challenges to do so. It must have clearly defined guidelines. The framework 
should be well-coordinated and highly transparent. It must have high-level cooperation and 
integrity, high level discipline and be very punitive, rehabilitative, efficient and effective. In 
addition, it must be rewarding to tax authorities, financial intelligence agencies, police, 
judges and magistrates (OECD, 2017; Markovits, 2015). It does not appear that the TGPs 
fully entail all these elements, neither does the EU legal regime against tax crimes provide 
all these imperatives – but the former is worth emulating by the latter. 
4. Conclusion 
The OECD’s TGPs, by far, constitute a reasonably robust framework requirement for 
countering tax crimes relative to the existing framework in the EU. The TGPs are feasible 
propositions that could establish minimum standards, which when rigorously pursued by 
the EU and its MS, could significantly help in reducing tax crimes in the EU. The tax legal 
regime of EU is developing and has already absorbed a number of the TGPs of OECD and is 
set to even help in making the OECD’s principles as legally enforceable as possible. 
Evidence provided by PROTAX and other researchers reveal that a number of EU countries 
have serious concerns for tax crimes and are adopting measures such as enshrined in the 
OECD principles to succeed (PROTAX, 2018). To counter tax crimes, it is imperative for EU 
countries to ensure that there is well-established sustenance of robust structures and 
processes in the EU that do not only frontally bring about highest transparency, effective 
coordinated intelligence gathering and analysis, effective cooperation and information 
sharing between LEAs and other relevant authorities in preventing, detecting and 
prosecuting tax crimes (OECD, 2018a). It should also ensure effective recovering of proceeds 
from tax crimes and delivering rehabilitation of convicts and public accountability in the use 
of tax proceeds. 
Notes 
1. Thirion and Scherrer (2017) opine that “the distinction between administrative tax offences and 
criminal tax offences is often blurred at Member State level and it is sometimes unclear whether 
these two types of sanction are complementary or conflicting” (p. 8). 
2. It should be noted that the FIUs in the EU have reported difficulties in exchanging information 
based on differences in national definitions of certain predicate offences, such as tax crimes, 
which are not harmonised by Union law. See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 30 May 2018, para. 18. 
3. The High Court of Paris (Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris- 32éme chambre correctionnelle) 
Decision No. 11203092066 of 12 January 2017. 
4. Despite these Member States having declared their transposition to be complete, the Commission 
concluded after assessing the notified measures that some provisions are missing and stated that 
gaps in one Member State can have an impact on all others. All Member States had to transpose 
the rules of this Directive by 26 June 2017. EU Commission (2019b), “January infringements 
package: key decisions”, Fact Sheet, 24 January, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-19-462_en.htm (accessed 1 February 2019). 
5. The FATF has identified some significant implementation challenges on beneficial ownership 
whereby only two of fourteen countries – Italy and Spain – were found to have a substantial level 
of effectiveness in establishing and verifying the accuracy of information on such databases. See 
Owens and McDonell (2018). 
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